Kriegsgrund-Recycling

GegenGerd, Freitag, 09. Mai 2003, 14:36 (vor 7678 Tagen) @ Evi Dentz

Ich zitiere mal den UNSCOM-Bericht von 1999 in nur
einigen Auszügen:
http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/dis-intr.
htm

17. In response to the Commission´s requests for
relevant documents, Iraq has repeatedly claimed
that they no longer exist or cannot be located, a
claim which often has been shown to be false,
either because inspection activities have in fact
located precisely such documents or because Iraq
has reversed its stated position and then produced
relevant documents.
33. Iraq declared that 550 shells filled with
mustard had been "lost" shortly after the Gulf
War. To date, no evidence of the missing munitions
has been found. Iraq claimed that the chemical
warfare agents filled into these weapons would be
degraded a long time ago and, therefore, there
would be no need for their accounting. However, a
dozen mustard-filled shells were recovered at a
former CW storage facility in the period
1997-1998. The chemical sampling of these
munitions, in April 1998, revealed that the
mustard was still of the highest quality.
35. The degree of verification achieved is not
satisfactory. Iraq declared that it had produced a
total of 3.9 tonnes of VX. Iraq provided documents
on production in 1988, but failed to provide
verifiable evidence for its activities in 1990.
Iraq also denies that it weaponized VX. Sampling
by the Commission of special warheads has thrown
significant doubt upon this claim.
37. Since the adoption of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991 and until July
1995, Iraq denied that it had had any proscribed
biological warfare (BW) activities. Based on the
results of its inspection and verification
activities, the Commission assessed and reported
to the Council in its report of April 1995, that
Iraq had not provided an account of its proscribed
biological programme nor accounted for materials
and items that may have been used or acquired for
such a programme. The Commission stated that with
Iraq´s failure to account for the use of these
items and materials for legitimate purposes, the
only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is
a high risk that they had been purchased and used
for a proscribed purpose - acquisition of
biological warfare agent. Iraq was provided with
evidence collected by the Commission. On 1 July
1995, Iraq, for the first time, acknowledged that
it had had an offensive BW programme but still
denied any weaponization. Subsequently, in August
1995, after the departure form Iraq of Lt. Gen.
Hussein Kamel Hassan, Iraq admitted that it had
weaponized BW agents and deployed biological
weapons for combat use.
41. Finally, it needs to be recognised that Iraq
possesses an industrial capability and knowledge
base, through which biological warfare agents
could be produced quickly and in volume, if the
Government of Iraq decided to do so.